








CRITICAL REALISM AND HEGEMONY 
 
Hic Rhoda, hic salta! 
 
 
HEGEMONY: a Realist Analysis 





This is a recent contribution to the Routledge series Studies in Critical Realism. Jonathan Joseph, its 
author, aims to develop Gramsci’s celebrated analysis of hegemony in a critical realist direction by 
distinguishing analytically between ‘structural hegemony’ and hegemonic projects and then 
connecting them dialectically. He develops this approach through a critical engagement not only with 
Gramsci’s work but also with other positions and debates within classical Marxism, Western Marxism, 
and post-Marxism. The intended result is a ‘theory of hegemony [that] combines the political moment 
of agency with the structural nature of social reproduction’ (161). He illustrates his arguments with 
observations on a range of historical conjunctural analyses drawn from classical Marxism (i.e., Lenin 
and Trotsky) and Western Marxism (notably the Anderson-Nairn thesis on the peculiarities of British 
development) and, for his contemporary analyses, from the development of Fordism and the state in 
post-war Britain in the context of globalization. And he concludes with the view that the Leninist 
theory of the vanguard party can be grounded in a critical realist understanding of the heterogeneity 
and complexity of capitalist social formations. 
 
Joseph has many interesting insights to offer on a range of philosophical and theoretical issues and 
also develops some well directed critiques of alternative accounts of hegemony and class struggle. 
Nonetheless, the overall argument is ultimately flawed in terms of its reading of Gramsci, its 
reification of structural hegemony as a causal or generative mechanism, its functional reading of the 
state as the key factor in the organization of hegemony in both its senses, its inability to provide a 
clear account of the articulation between the economic and the extra-economic, and its taken-for-
granted acceptance of the validity of Leninism as a theory and practice of revolution. Before I begin 
to introduce these criticisms I will summarize the main arguments of the early chapters and locate 
them in the wider debates with which they are concerned. 
 
Joseph wastes no time in presenting the main aim of his book, namely, to move away from a purely 
agential conception of hegemony to consider its underlying structural moments. He claims that 
hegemony is generally seen to involve the exercise of leadership by the dominant group over 
subordinate groups in and through the construction of consent. This agential approach may be 
developed through an elaborate conceptual vocabulary to address the multiple aspects of such 
leadership but, even in its more complex forms, it remains one-sided in its emphasis on the 
strategies, plans and actions of social agents, groups, and individuals. And this in turn may 
encourage a mistaken view of history and politics in which key social processes are simply the 
products of significant social actors or groups. To redress the one-sided character of this approach 
  
to, Joseph proposes to explore the underlying conditions that make hegemonic leadership 
necessary, the conditions under which successful hegemonic leadership can be exercised, and the 
impact of structural crises of hegemony on the dominant group’s capacity to maintain consent to its 
leadership. In short, he aims to explore the articulation between the agential aspects of hegemony 
and its underlying ‘structurality’.  
 
Joseph also claims that critical naturalism and transcendental realism together provide the most 
appropriate theoretical framework in which to investigate the mutual conditioning of these agential 
and structural aspects. He then presents good, Bhaskar-inspired summaries of critical naturalism as 
a philosophy of social science; of transcendental realism as an account of the relations between the 
transitive and intransitive dimensions of knowledge of the natural and social worlds; of the 
implications of these views for the ontological depth and stratification of social formations; of the 
transformational model of social action, according to which structure conditions agency, choice, and 
strategy and agents’ actions in turn feed back into structural change or stability; and of the research 
methods adopted in critical realism to retroduce and test causal explanations. But he also criticizes 
Bhaskar’s more recent emphasis on the ‘primacy of the negative’ as a threat to detailed causal 
analysis and as a stimulus to speculative rather than well grounded analysis. All of this indicates that 
we should expect Joseph to provide a rigorous account of hegemony and its generative mechanisms 
and to present well justified, empirically testable empirical explanations about his selected historical 
cases. This in turn, he promises us, will provide the basis for transformative practices that can direct 
and focus political action to promote working class emancipation. 
 
Following these theoretical preliminaries, Joseph summarizes what he sees as the key themes and 
arguments in Gramsci’s work on hegemony. He praises Gramsci for his strong grasp of the political 
and the historical but adds that his work lacks the scope of Marx’s synthesis of German philosophy, 
French politics, and British economics. In particular, Gramsci’s political and historical sensitivities 
come at the expense of a weak understanding of the economic and this is linked to Gramsci’s rather 
subjective, voluntarist, historicist and even idealist concern to develop an ontology of praxis at the 
expense of considering the structural underpinnings of hegemonic practices and the basic structural 
constraints on attempts to produce social transformation. It is in this context that Joseph identifies 
some of the leading intellectual influences in Gramsci’s ontology of praxis, including Machiavelli’s 
practical realism, Croce’s philosophy of will, and Sorel’s spontaneist and ethical revolutionary activity. 
But he goes on to note that we can gain a better understanding of the affinities between critical 
realism and Gramsci’s analyses of hegemony through an examination of his social and political 
analysis rather than from a reconstruction of his general philosophical notions. This is where we can 
discover, he claims, the implicit realism in Gramsci’s analysis of the multi-layered nature of social 
relations, the complexities of the balance of class forces, the articulation of different mechanisms of 
domination, the dynamics of consent and leadership.  
 
At this point one might expect a detailed exposition of Gramsci’s arguments about the nature of 
hegemony, the different modalities of the exercise of domination from coercion through force-fraud-
corruption and passive revolution to active consent, the relation between state and civil society, the 
nature of the political party, the role of organic intellectuals, the relationship between wars of position 
and manoeuvre, and so on. Instead, drawing heavily on Perry Anderson’s critique of the antinomies 
in Gramsci’s superficially confusing definitions of the state and civil society, Joseph notes the 
looseness of Gramsci’s analytical and empirical distinction between state and civil society and 
suggests that hegemony is best understood as operating across these spheres. What Anderson 
failed to note was that the definitions of the state apparatus that he critiques make sense in terms of 
a relational approach to state power and that Gramsci was more concerned with the modalities of the 
exercise of state power than with a rigid demarcation of the boundaries of the state apparatus. This 
neglect is carried over into Joseph’s interpretation, which also pays little attention to these modalities 
and works instead with a generic notion of hegemonic leadership. Joseph also comments on 
Gramsci’s account of the ‘historical bloc’ as the historically contingent unity of structure and 
 
superstructure and his views on the different dimensions of the balance of forces. On this basis, he 
concludes that a key aspect of this work is Gramsci’s implicit emphasis on how hegemony operates 
in and through an already stratified reality to produce a relative unity at the structural level (e.g., the 
historical bloc as unity of structure and superstructure) and at the political level (e.g., the historical 
bloc as a unity of dominant classes and subordinate groups). This indicates the need for two 
concepts of hegemony: structural and political (or agential). Joseph concludes that, for Gramsci, 
hegemony provides the political, or class-struggle, moment in the interaction between structures and 
agents. It is an emergent process, it intersects with structures and has a key role in their 
reproduction, and, in the form of political leadership, it is exercised in the light of structure and 
conjuncture.  
 
Rather than engaging in a critical exegesis of Gramsci or developing the implications of the key 
arguments and insights that he does attribute to him, Joseph moves quickly on to consider how Lenin 
and Trotsky engaged in concrete political analysis and drew conclusions about political leadership. 
He claims that these theorists and revolutionaries also embraced a sort of realism in their historical 
political analyses and that an implicit notion of hegemony can also be extracted from their work. In 
particular, he suggests, the relations between party, vanguard, and masses reflect a stratified world 
of structures, agents, and activities. Indeed, it is the very heterogeneity of this stratified world that 
requires political choices to be made and political organization to guide and develop political choices 
and action. And it is the uneven development of this multi-layered, stratified world that requires 
permanent revolution. While broadly favourable to Lenin’s positions on these matters, Joseph is even 
more supportive of Trotsky’s, defending him against several of Gramsci’s criticisms and arguing that 
Trotsky’s analyses of bureaucratism and culture enable him to go beyond the culturalism that is 
sometimes attributed to Gramsci. In this respect Joseph devotes more space to Trotsky’s analyses of 
Russia, Britain, and Germany to indicate how close they are to Gramsci’s approach than he does to 
Gramsci’s own historical and political analyses. It seems that Joseph is more concerned to show that 
Gramsci was an implicit critical realist and that Trotsky is the equal of Gramsci than he is to elucidate 
Gramsci’s structural and agential concepts for the analysis of hegemony. Nonetheless he does 
concede that Trotsky tends to see the state in instrumental terms and to regard hegemony as a 
potential tool of different classes in the same conjuncture—reflecting his failure to ground hegemony 
sufficiently strongly in the underlying structures of a given social formation. 
 
A similar line of criticism is deployed against a number of Western Marxists. Thus Joseph argues that 
Raymond Williams extends the notion of the ‘base’ to include a humanist notion of praxis and makes 
hegemony a totalizing praxis. But Williams’ anti-economistic turn is allegedly achieved at the cost of 
underplaying the structural aspects of hegemony and flattening the social totality so that it lacks 
ontological depth. In similar vein, Joseph accuses E. P.  Thompson’s notion of the ‘making’ of the 
working class of neglecting the character of the structures, processes, and mechanisms that enable 
individuals and groups to act; of reducing relationships to the modes of experiencing them; and of 
reducing classes to their modes of action. Thus, while Thompson certainly retains some sort of 
notion of hegemony, it lacks structure and is more akin to politics from below. A review of the 
celebrated debate over the ‘peculiarities of the English’ inspired by the Anderson-Nairn thesis leads 
Joseph to the same conclusions. Overall, he suggests, the base-superstructure metaphor is too 
clumsy to do the work expected of it. In contrast, critical realism enables us to move away from this 
metaphor. It proposes to replace it with an account of an interconnected and stratified set of 
structures that ‘hang together’ non-deterministically—with some structures more important but 
always dialectically related to the others. 
 
Turning to the work of the early Poulantzas, especially his interventions in the Anderson-Nairn 
debate, Joseph argues that Poulantzas commits the opposite error. His early work emphasizes the 
structural element of hegemony almost to the exclusion of any conscious application of hegemonic 
leadership. Thus it sees political hegemony as an expression of mechanically reproduced structural 
determination. Joseph also comments on the later Poulantzas but again tends to short-circuit his 
  
exposition through his own political prejudices against the latter’s abandonment of Leninism in favour 
of left Eurocommunism. Thus, while Joseph is aware that Poulantzas moves on to a relational 
account of the state as the material condensation of the balance of class forces in struggle, he 
charges that Poulantzas sometimes relates hegemony to structures, sometimes to political class 
positions, and that he cannot satisfactorily combine the structural determination of hegemony with its 
political expression and class development. This charge is broadly correct, as I have shown 
elsewhere; but it should not disguise the many important contributions Poulantzas did make, 
especially in his work on fascism, military dictatorships, and contemporary capitalism and its 
authoritarian state, to a critical realist, strategic-relational approach to the understanding of 
economic, political, and ideological class domination. Here too the problem seems to be that Joseph 
is more interested in moving quickly to Trotsky’s superiority over a given theorist than he is in 
providing a thorough analysis of that theorist’s contribution in its own terms. This leads him to 
neglect, for example, Poulantzas’s insights into the spatiality and temporality of class power and its 
mediation through the state—a theme that Joseph himself will take up in the second half of his own 
book—or, again, the crisis of post-war political economy and its implications for the restructuring of 
the capitalist state and its adoption of new economic and social policies to restore the conditions for 
capital accumulation and bourgeois hegemony. 
 
The final chapter in the first half of Hegemony turns to the work of Derrida and the deconstructionists 
and to the discourse analysis of Laclau and Mouffe. I found the critiques in this chapter more 
convincing than the two preceding chapters—perhaps because I am more favourably inclined to 
Poulantzas than Laclau and Mouffe! After some favourable comments on Derrida’s discussion of the 
fixing of meaning as a political process based on relations of power and domination and of the key 
role of displacement and deferral in maintaining meaning, Joseph concludes that the Derrideans 
elevate textual practice above all other practices and that the playfulness of Derrida’s concept of 
différance leaves us with nothing concrete. To overcome this, suggests Joseph, it is essential to 
combine hegemony with a notion of class and to move beyond epistemic relativism and a concern 
with language to develop a realist ontology. As well as his now ritual critique of their 
Eurocommunism, Joseph also offers some excellent criticisms of Laclau and Mouffe for moving 
towards ideological reductionism in their attempt to break with economism and for their embrace of 
the Wittgensteinian idealism of language games at the expense of any serious engagement with 
material reality. He suggests that their concept of hegemony ‘is little more than another word for 
articulation with an element of decision thrown in’ and that ‘hegemony loses its true meaning once it 
is separated from its material location in social practices and structures and is confined to the role of 
a discursive articulator’ (104). Joseph’s critique of their epistemic relativism is carried forward 
relentlessly and robustly and he shows convincingly that they set up the debate between Marxism 
and post-Marxism in terms that ensure that Marxism loses. Yet their post-Marxism, lacking any 
foundations in a critique of the materiality of contemporary capitalism, is obliged to take a pragmatic 
turn à la Rorty. This involves an emphasis on praxis without recognizing the ontological depth of the 
social world and ends up in vicious circularity. For, ‘at a theoretical level, discourse is reduced to 
hegemony, while, inversely, at a practical level, hegemony is reduced to discourse’ (119–20). 
 
In the second half of his book, Joseph aims to sketch the theoretical framework for a critical realist 
analysis of the structural and strategic moments of hegemony. He begins by reiterating his earlier 
claim that there are two types of hegemony: structural and surface. He now adds that this distinction 
involves a dialectical abstraction and that, in actuality, both aspects are clearly linked and mutually 
dependent. In this context, ‘hegemony in its deeper sense has the role of securing the unity and 
cohesion of the social system and in ensuring the reproduction of basic structural processes and 
relations. In this sense, hegemony is fundamental to the unity of all human societies and is a basic 
material necessity concerned with the interrelation of the different parts of the social whole’ (128). 
Neither here nor later are we given a more detailed account of the nature of hegemony in this 
deeper, more structural form: it appears to be the name for a necessary function and/or a naturally 
necessary property of all human societies. Indeed, hegemony is inescapable. For, ‘weak or strong, 
 
dynamic or useless, hegemony is always with us’ (211). But we are never told how this necessary 
function is realized nor how it is generated through a given set of mechanisms to become a naturally 
necessary property of all human societies. Yet it is nonetheless said to be the precondition, or the 
pre-existing cause, of the various alternative hegemonic projects that express it on the surface of all 
human societies. Indeed, the fact that there are such hegemonic projects is an important 
manifestation of this deeper, structural hegemony.  
 
This approach poses serious problems for Joseph’s analysis and his claim to develop a critical realist 
analysis of hegemony. For critical realism should be concerned to identify generative mechanisms 
and not just to provide a name for the site of a problem, a holding term for a subsequent analysis, or 
a label for a postulated generic property of all societies. It is almost tautological to assert without 
theoretical justification or elaboration that ‘hegemony has a functional role in relation to the unity of 
social formation. … If hegemony holds things together, it succeeds; if it fails, a hegemonic crisis 
emerges which has to be resolved’ (211). Even if we were to accept that it is worthwhile, as Marx 
indicates in his 1857 Introduction, to develop rational abstractions that specify the generic properties 
of a given theoretical category or object (such as ‘production’), hegemony hardly qualifies as such a 
definitional property of all human societies—let alone as one of its naturally necessary properties. It 
is also worth noting that Gramsci himself saw the struggle for national-popular hegemony as a 
historically specific feature of the age of mass politics (e.g., in post-unification Italy) rather than as a 
universal feature of all societies. This was also the view of Poulantzas, both in his early, preliminary 
remarks on hegemony and in his subsequent theoretical and empirical analyses. This is not 
inconsistent with the claim that structural hegemony is a universal feature but it would invite 
reflections on the forms of hegemony that preceded struggles over the ‘national-popular’.  
 
Indeed, this is a general problem with Joseph’s analysis of the structural moment of hegemony: for it 
lacks the mediations or intermediate concepts that would enable a movement from rational 
abstraction to concrete-complex analysis. Instead, the manner in which he posits structural 
hegemony means that it becomes an ontologically empty condition of possibility of hegemonic 
projects that constrains and enables their form and content. As we shall see, this is particularly 
problematic in his analysis of the economy and politics, since Joseph provides us with no concepts 
with which to analyse economic forms, tendential laws, or crisis-tendencies as the basis for 
theorizing economic regulation. Likewise, although he argues that the state is the key factor in 
securing hegemony both in its structural and its agential sense, he nowhere defines the state as a 
form, a set of functions, or an institutional ensemble nor explains how it serves as a generative 
mechanism for the exercise of hegemony (see below).  
 
Joseph’s suggestion that the two moments of hegemony are related in the same way as Bhaskar’s 
two modalities of power—enabling power and power over—does not help us here. Joseph suggests 
that we can distinguish between hegemony1 (basic materiality with an intrinsic functionality) and 
hegemony2 (hegemonic projects, practices, struggles) and that there is a dialectical relationship 
between them. In the absence of an adequate definition of the materiality of hegemony1 as opposed 
to its functionality, however, it is impossible to develop this dialectic and use it to generate 
explanations. At best we are provided with historical examples of the strength or weakness of 
structure, superstructure, and their articulation in a historical bloc and their implications for 
hegemonic projects (e.g., in Joseph’s comments on Gramsci’s and Trotsky’s analyses of twentieth 
century Italy, Germany, and Spain and his own reflections on the British case). This is supplemented 
by an argument that hegemony organizes relations between different structures and practices to 
secure the unity of a social formation and that ideology is the means by which subjects function 
within their social practices. However, because there is always a plurality of ideologies, structural 
hegemony is also required to secure social reproduction by conforming the relations between 
structures, mechanisms, and practices as well as between different structures. Here again we see 
the necessity of structural hegemony posited but no account of how it achieves this miraculous, 
improbable unification of a heterogeneous, contradictory, conflictual social formation. It just happens. 
  
And, if it ceases to happen, a structural hegemonic crisis will ensure that it soon happens again. To 
help to secure this improbable outcome, the state develops to organize hegemony. Indeed, the state 
has a vital strategic role in organizing hegemony, not just in the interests of particular groups, but in 
order to secure the basic unity of the social formation (161).  
 
An important feature of structural hegemony in this context is its role in marking out the sites of 
different spatial and temporal convergences involved in different sets of relations, mechanisms, 
structures, practices and processes. Indeed, ‘hegemony both structures and is structured by space 
and time’ (162). Building on the work of the Annales School and the Althusserians, Joseph develops 
some important comments on the problems posed by the multiplicity of temporalities and spatialities 
implicit in social relations, of temporal and spatial horizons, of uneven development, survivals, and 
emergent times and spaces, of the co-determination of synchrony and diachrony, and the difficulties 
these pose both for social unity and for the writing of total history and totalizing analyses. 
 
In addition to his emphasis on the primacy of diachrony over synchrony, Joseph also insists on a 
critical realist theory of space as making a difference by virtue of particular causal powers and 
liabilities constituting it. Space figures here both as a structural matrix that helps to secure the unity 
of structures and as a terrain on which hegemonic practices seek to colonize and reconfigure space 
in given material conditions. In its political (or strategic) moment, hegemony fills space with ideology. 
In developing these ideas, Joseph draws in part on Lefebvre and Foucault; but he could have 
exploited Lefebvre’s analyses more in dealing with spatiality, spaces of representation, and 
representational spaces as well as the geographical historical materialism of theorists such as David 
Harvey. What is more, even without moving beyond the pages of the Prison Notebooks, Joseph 
could have found very interesting insights in Gramsci’s own deeply spatialized as well as historicized 
analyses of hegemony. For Gramsci explores spatiality and the spatialization of hegemony on a wide 
range of scales from the transatlantic diffusion of Americanism and Fordism through the European 
impact of French Jacobinism to the hegemony of Piedmont in Italian unification to the Southern 
Question or the dynamics of cities and town-country relations. 
 
After his general comments on the spatiality and temporality of structural hegemony and hegemonic 
practices, Joseph turns finally to an analysis of the crucial role of hegemony in securing the 
conditions of the expanded reproduction of the capital relation. His last substantive chapter combines 
critical realism, his own theorization of hegemony, and debates around accumulation and regulation. 
His ambition here is to replace the familiar but flawed base/superstructure model and its allegedly 
mono-causal determination with a theory based on a dialectically stratified multi-determination that 
problematizes the nature of the economic ‘base’ and insists on the extra-economic conditions that 
must be secured for the economy to be reproduced. Joseph argues that this involves a shift of focus 
from the ‘inherent laws of capital’ to the social conditions necessary to overcome any inherent 
tendency towards crisis. However, since he does not define the economy or suggest how it might be 
demarcated in principle or in historically specific terms from the extra-economic, does not define the 
specificity or the distinctive economic forms of capitalism, and does not identify systematically the 
inherent laws of capital accumulation (referring only to a couple of these laws in passing), it is hard to 
see how the social conditions that are necessary to overcome crisis-tendencies can be known or 
secured. Indeed, Joseph argues that economic processes operate within a complex totality and lack 
their own autonomous logic and that, since the conditions for economic reproduction are not given 
but socially secured and politically advanced, it is impossible to separate the economic from a wider 
social context (185, 189). At most we can assume that, insofar as capital accumulation continues, 
these conditions—whatever they might be—have been secured.  
 
Accordingly, Joseph’s approach to the economy and regulation assumes a strongly functional 
orientation. And, in this context, he privileges the role of the state (another key concept that, like 
hegemony itself, goes undefined) as being ‘clearly best placed to perform this central regulatory 
 
function’ even though its internal structural-organizational heterogeneity and competing social 
interests mean that there can be no guarantee of its functionality (184).  
 
It is unclear why the state, whether alone or primarily, must or can perform this function. In part this is 
because Joseph fails to define the state even though he had earlier deployed Perry Anderson’s 
critique of the ambiguities and, indeed, antinomies, in Gramsci’s account of the state in its inclusive 
sense. In part, it is because he fails to specify the distinctive properties of the state as a structure, 
institutional ensemble, or collective agent that enable it to play this role. And, in part, it is because it 
is unclear what other institutions exist that could realize this crucially necessary function—for Joseph 
refers only to the economy and the state and not, for example, to civil society, let alone specific 
structures of institutional ensembles within it. In this sense we are not told how broadly the state 
should be defined and whether it might include economic and ideological state apparatuses as well 
as police-military functions. At least Gramsci referred to the importance of civil society as well as the 
state in its narrow sense, emphasizing that state power in advanced capitalist societies involved 
hegemony armoured by coercion, and referred to a number of specific state institutions and activities. 
In short, once more we find a crucial concept goes undefined apart from its function. This makes it 
impossible to consider whether or not the state form or particular instantiations of the state 
problematize the state’s functionality (or capacity to perform its naturally necessary functions) and, if 
so, whether there are alternative or supplementary mechanisms that might compensate for such 
dysfunctionality or incapacity. It is insufficient here to suggest that these issues can be left 
unresolved at the level of deep, structural hegemony because they can be resolved in practice at the 
level of state strategies and/or hegemonic practices. For, without an adequate account of the nature 
and limitations of the state form (or particular forms of state), it is unclear what problems state 
strategies and/or hegemonic projects must solve and how the state considered as a strategic terrain 
may facilitate the development of the appropriate practices. 
 
This leads Joseph to the wholly unsatisfactory conclusion that ‘the capitalist state persists because it 
is best suited to the economic system. If it was no good, it would not persist and the problem would 
be a different one. […] In a Spinozist sense the state and its relations ‘hang together’’ (187). This 
conclusion is not only essentially functionalist but also inconsistent with the protocols that Joseph 
himself, in deference to Bhaskar, had earlier identified as characteristic of critical realism—especially 
the retroduction of generative mechanisms, the formulation of explanatory accounts, and their 
empirical testing against alternatives. Without knowing how to define the economy, how to demarcate 
it from the extra-economic, how economic laws operate to produce crisis-tendencies, how economic 
deficits are compensated in and through the extra-economic, etc., it is impossible to retroduce any 
specific and testable explanatory propositions. In this context hegemony, operating in both its 
structural and strategic moments, appears as a retroduced deus ex machina operated by the state 
rather than as a real generative mechanism. Moreover, given the lack of serious definition of the 
structural moment and how it enables and/or constrains specific hegemonic projects, the argument is 
bound to move in the voluntarist, agentialist direction that Joseph earlier criticized in Gramsci. Thus, 
as Joseph himself notes, the state must play the leading and directing role in securing hegemony; 
and the dominant social groups must ensure the conditions for accumulation and consent (206).  
 
The problems with this approach become clear in the historical analysis that Joseph offers of the 
post-war settlement in Britain and its relation to the post-war global order tied to transatlantic 
Fordism. The basic story that Joseph presents here would be familiar to many and, since it has been 
told from many different perspectives, it would be hard to claim that it is the unique product of critical 
realism, a theory of hegemony, and the regulation approach as opposed to a re-description of a well 
known story in a partially new language. As an example of passive revolution, the post-warsettlement 
involved the tradeoff by subordinate classes of economic and social benefits such as full 
employment, mass consumption, and welfare rights for political exclusion. This was enabled by the 
development of mass production and state regulation; and state regulation in turn created the 
conditions for mass production and mass consumption. This correspondence between the 
  
accumulation regime and its mode of regulation began to break down in the 1970s and led to a 
disjunction between the requirements of economic crisis-management and a transition to a new 
mode of growth, on the one hand, and, on the other, the continued reproduction of the hegemonic 
bloc (understood by Joseph to include the political relations between the dominant class, its 
supporting classes, and privileged sections of the working class). The emerging strategy of neo-
liberal flexibilization is the dominant (or hegemonic?) response and its successful promotion requires 
a weakening of organized labour. In part this also requires a rescaling of markets and states, with 
globalization and triadization proceeding as parallel responses to this new set of economic demands. 
As indicated above, it is far from clear how this analysis is directly grounded in critical realism, the 
regulation approach, or a theory of hegemony. And it is also far from clear how it has been 
retroduced, elaborated, and tested according to the protocols of critical realism as opposed to being 
drawn from quite conventional accounts.  
 
The concluding chapter does not resolve the problems noted above. It simply affirms the overall 
validity of critical realism as an approach and the claim that a critical realist approach can avoid the 
difficulties of an agential analysis of hegemonic projects. Critical realism can do this because it 
provides the means to analyse hegemony as a layered process that organizes the relations between 
different social groups within a ruling bloc and between that bloc and wider layers in society and to 
ground this analysis in the nature of structural hegemony as the naturally necessary mechanism in 
and through which all human societies are unified despite their contradictions and resistance to 
permanent regulation. Joseph re-affirms the vital structural and strategic role of the state in 
organizing hegemony and its relation to what Gramsci (but not Joseph) termed its ‘decisive economic 
nucleus’. Finally, if by now predictably, he tells us that Leninism can be justified by critical realism. 
For both Leninism and critical realism emphasize the complex, heterogeneous nature of social 
totalities and recognize the tri-unity of space, time, causality (218). And this in turn justifies the role of 
the party before the revolution and the state after the revolution in guiding and leading the working 
class in its struggle against capital. 
 
To conclude this review, let me say that Jonathan Joseph has quite correctly identified the crucial 
contribution that critical realism can make to a re-reading of Gramsci and to an effective theorization 
of hegemony. But he has not managed to deliver what he has promised. There are many reasons for 
this failure, some of which I have indicated above. But it does not mean that the challenge he has 
rightly posed to critical realists, historical materialists, and those who would seek to change the world 
as well as to interpret it, is inherently flawed. Instead it is a challenge that becomes even more urgent 
as the neo-liberal flexibilization that he identifies and the tendency to a reassertion of American 
imperialism that he does not anticipate become more powerful. Joseph has identified the problem. It 
is important that others now help to solve it. 
